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HOT SPOTS IN THE LEGISLATIVE CLIMATE 
CHANGE PROPOSALS 
Carol M. Rose∗ 
Victor Flatt’s “Legislative Temperature” on climate change provides a 
useful typology of the proposals now under consideration in the U.S. Con-
gress.1  Professor Flatt ultimately leaves it to us to decide which proposal is 
“best.”  But by tacit consensus, our legislators have already decided one 
element of the “best” legislation: it will include some version of market-
based regulation (“MBR”), in the form of cap-and-trade programs or even 
(gasp!) taxes.2  As Professor Flatt suggests, this development could hardly 
have been predicted from previous pollution control legislation, which gen-
erally adopted various kinds of command-and-control regulation.3 
What happened?  Professor Flatt attributes the congressional change of 
heart to the apparent success of the one notable exception to command-and-
control regulation; that was the effort to reduce acid rain through a cap-and-
trade regime for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990.4  But Congress instituted the acid rain MBR only af-
ter a long and increasingly expensive slog through command-and-control 
regulation.  Indeed, cap-and-trade was to act as a kind of relief from the 
growing costs of pollution abatement through command-and-control meth-
ods.5  This is a typical progression of legislative form; in other areas as 
well, like controlling overfishing, resource economists have noted that so-
phisticated MBRs only arrive after more cumbersome regulatory regimes 
have shown their limitatio 6
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So, once again, why does Congress prefer MBRs for this issue of 
greenhouse gas control, without experimenting with other kinds of regula-
tion first?  Professor Flatt is undoubtedly right that the early introduction of 
MBRs to address this new issue reflects a dose of environmental learning—
especially learning about the cost-saving capacity of MBRs like cap-and-
trade programs.  Indeed, the word on the street has been that the U.S. busi-
ness community would not accept greenhouse gas controls in the absence of 
cap-and-trade.7 
But a few other factors may be at work as well, particularly the charac-
teristics of the chief global warming pollutant, carbon dioxide (CO2).  As 
Professor Flatt notes, CO2 effectively takes the gas out of many of the major 
objections to MBRs.8  The naggers (of whom I have been one) have always 
complained about hotspots in cap-and-trade regimes, and about the inap-
propriateness of trading complex and non-fungible resources like wetlands 
and habitat.9  But CO2 floats to the upper atmosphere and mixes around, no 
matter who produces it or where it is produced, creating no hotspots or any 
other kind of nonfungibility.  It persists in the atmosphere, too, so it does 
not even matter when it is produced.  Any batch of CO2 can be traded for 
any other, from any time, from or to any place.  Besides that, on the moral 
front, it is hard to make devils out of CO2 producers.  The stuff is not poi-
son, after all, and it does not give anyone heart attacks or cancer, like the 
other big air pollutants.  Our current climate dilemma feels more like the 
situation that occurs when too many people in a room make the whole place 
too hot.  Yes, it is awful, but whose fault is that?  So why not allow trading, 
if trading helps cool the place off? 
But the current legislative proposals have another and even bigger sur-
prise for careful observers.  The surprise is not just that these proposals 
showcase MBRs; it is that they plan to make emitters pay, right off the bat.  
Thomas Merrill, taking a leaf from Gary Libecap, observes that market-
based regimes may make a lot of sense overall, but that they usually are de-
railed politically unless the potential losers get paid off.10  That is to say, 
distributional concerns—who wins and who loses—too often trump effi-
ciency in the sense of the greatest good for the greatest number.  What this 
 
7  See Alan Murray, Why Key Executives are Warming to Legislation on Climate Change, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 7, 2007, at A1 (describing shift in business community to accept global warming legislation, 
provided it includes cap-and-trade program). 
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Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 662–63 (2000) (noting fungibility problem in wetlands trades); Carol M. 
Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance 
Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y F. 45, 60–61 
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10  See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 296–97 (de-
scribing Gary Libecap’s view that more efficient management regimes still require payoffs to those who 
did well in old system). 
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has meant for U.S. environmental policy is (1) a paltry number of MBRs, 
and (2) those MBRs taking the form of cap-and-trade rather than tax, with 
(3) the old emitters getting a free pass, more or less, through a gracious 
helping of grandfathered free emission rights.11 
That is why the new climate proposals are such a surprise.  Not only do 
their proponents call for market-oriented controls right from the start, but 
some of them are talking about cap-and-trade rights being allocated by auc-
tion instead of grandfathering, and at least one, Representative John Dingell 
(D., Mich.), has floated the idea of a (gasp again!) tax instead of cap-and-
trade.  Both auctions and taxes would have the unprecedented effect of put-
ting money in the public treasury instead of the old emitters’ pockets, and 
there are plenty of ideas about how to spend it.12  Moreover, the greenhouse 
gas proposals have revived a mini-debate about the relative merits of emis-
sion taxes as opposed to cap-and-trade.13  Economists on the whole like 
taxes better than cap-and-trade, at least for greenhouse gases, chiefly be-
cause they think taxes would be less complicated administratively and be-
cause taxes could avoid the price volatility that might accompany cap-and-
trade.14 
But no one cared all that much about economists’ preferences in the 
past; why should they matter now?15  A cynical possibility is that Represen-
tative Dingell now proposes a carbon tax while continuing to believe, as he 
has said in the past, that a greenhouse gas tax would be so unpopular that 
the American public would never tolerate it.16  If that is the case, then pro-
posing a tax is just a ploy to make us forget about the whole thing and go 
back to driving around in the Detroit cars so dear to Representative Din-
gell’s heart.17  This ruse would be Machiavellian, but it might be too sim-
 
11  Id. at 282–85. 
12  See, e.g., Cost of Controlling Carbon Emissions: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 
110th Cong. 11–12 (Nov. 1, 2007) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Of-
fice) (suggesting that proceeds from government sale of allowances could be used to alleviate economic 
dislocations from higher costs of emissions, or to reduce the deficit, or to lower corporate taxes, or to 
make lump-sum payments to households) [hereinafter Cost of Controlling Carbon Emissions]. 
13  See Amena H. Saiyid, Congressional Budget Office Says Carbon Tax Preferable to Cap-and-
Trade Regime, [2007] Daily Env’t Rpt. (BNA) No. 212 (Nov. 2), at A-2 (describing debate between 
several members of the Congressional Budget Office and the Natural Resources Defense Council’s Da-
vid Doniger over carbon tax versus cap-and-trade). 
14  Id.; see also Cost of Controlling Carbon Emissions, supra note 12, at 4–5 (describing these and 
other advantages of tax over cap-and-trade); Dean Scott, Congressional Economist Says Carbon Tax 
More Efficient than Cap-and-Trade Effort, [2006] Daily Env’t Rpt. (BNA) No. 59 (March 28), at A-5; 
cf. Robert Hahn & Peter Passell, Time to Change U.S. Climate Policy, 4 The Economists’ Voice, iss. 5, 
art. 2 (2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss5/art2 (link), (arguing for cap and trade 
over tax on grounds of political feasibility). 
15  See Merrill, supra note 10, at 281–89 (observing paucity of market-based regulation and domi-
nance of distributional concerns over efficiency in past environmental legislation). 
16  David Leonhardt, What is John Dingell Really Up To?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007, at C1. 
17  Id.  
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ple-minded for a political pro like Representative Dingell.  Perhaps another 
factor is at work: Representative Dingell knows that pain is on the way for 
the auto industry, and a tax will help to share the pain with some other big 
emitters, notably the oil industry and the utilities—or possibly even shift a 
bit more of the pain to them.  I do not mean to present Representative Din-
gell as the bad guy; for the moment, he is the good guy for floating the po-
litically radical idea of carbon taxes, whatever his motives.  But the chief 
reason why these polluter-pay proposals now seem feasible may be that so 
many entities are involved in greenhouse gases that no single interest group 
can dominate the discussion, opening things up for ideas that economists 
like, especially taxes. 
Nevertheless, most of the proposals are for cap-and-trade rather than 
emission or carbon taxes, and there are some other political reasons for this.  
The most obvious reason is self-seeking on the part of current emitters.  
Unlike taxes, cap-and-trade emission entitlements are easy to grandfather to 
the polluting entities themselves, and this feature makes cap-and-trade at-
tractive to those entities and their lobbyists.18  But other reasons are not nec-
essarily self-seeking.  For one thing, we already have experience with cap-
and-trade, from our own SO2 program and from Europe and Japan’s more 
recent but somewhat messy experience with greenhouse gas emission 
trades.19  For another, a U.S. cap and trade program would help American 
firms to make connections with those other countries’ existing programs, 
and also to take credit for any voluntary reductions they already made while 
waiting for the U.S. to catch up.20  For still another, there are some impor-
tant global distributional questions that are tricky to address with taxes.  As 
the economists have noted, the best tax would be uniform throughout the 
world, to prevent the “leakage” problem that occurs when firms relocate to 
low- or no-tax jurisdictions.21  The trouble with this desideratum is that it 
requires less developed countries (LDCs) to agree to a tax that puts their 
new industries in the same boat with those of the United States and Eu-
rope—a dim prospect, given the LDCs’ fervent opposition.22  A cap-and-
 
18  Merrill, supra note 10, at 286–89. 
19  See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Outsize Profits, and Questions, in Effort to Cut Warming Gases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at A1 (describing payments made to destroy Chinese-manufactured air condition-
ing chemical being sufficiently lucrative to encourage expansion of manufacturing plants). 
20  See Nicholas DiMascio, Note, Credit Where Credit Is Due: The Legal Treatment of Early Green-
house Gas Emissions Reductions, 56 DUKE L. J. 1587, 1589–90 (2007) (noting that under any future 
U.S. cap and trade program, credits are likely for firms’ past voluntary greenhouse gas reductions); Jeff 
Goodell, Capital Pollution Solution?, N. Y. TIMES MAG., July 30, 2006, § 6 (describing creation of Chi-
cago Climate Exchange as potential vehicle for emissions trades between U.S. and other countries). 
21  See Scott, supra note 14 (citing CBO official Robert Shackleton in speech noting that economists 
prefer global uniform tax); see also Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally:  The Limits of 
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967–73 (2007) (describing various facets of “leak-
age” issue in non-universal control systems). 
22  See Scott, supra note 14 (citing CBO official Shackleton’s observation that less developed coun-
tries object to a uniform tax). 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/4/ 192
102:189  (2008) Hot Spots 
trade program, on the other hand, can grant LDCs some extra allowances or 
a higher baseline, with the effect that U.S. and European industries will buy 
up some of their allowances, effectively paying them to use cleaner tech-
nology or plant trees.23 
Payoffs to LDCs bring up another issue between these two MBR ap-
proaches.  One big lesson of the U.S. acid rain program is that trade allows 
substitute performance.  Where costs differ as between different players, 
substitute performance can save a lot of money.  Trade effectively gives an 
emitting entity a third option: in addition to (1) fixing the problem with bet-
ter technology or less activity, or (2)  paying the cost of emissions (by buy-
ing rights or paying taxes), (3) it can also pay somebody else to fix emission 
problems more cheaply in some other plant.  This additional choice is obvi-
ous with cap-and-trade, but taxes can have the same third option if they add 
a gimmick: tax credits for substitute performance or “offsets.”24  Either 
way, the emitter can save on compliance costs, while the substitute per-
former gets paid to cut back on emissions.  On the whole, LDCs offer CO2 
emitters a lot of chances for cutting costs through substitute performance 
while providing the LDCs with some benefits too; European or American 
firms could more easily install new technology in the LDCs’ new plants 
than in their own old ones, or they could buy up conservation easements as 
offsets, encouraging LDCs to halt old growth forest burnoff and coinciden-
tally preserve importantly biodiverse habitats. 
But wait!  Conserving old growth forests doesn’t count!  The Kyoto 
Protocol does not allow credits for them, thanks in large part to the Europe-
ans, who have few forested areas themselves and who are notoriously tight-
fisted about giving credit for any kind of forestry projects.25  To be sure, 
old-growth credits might help damp down the forest flames that now pour 
CO2 into the air around the equator, and to be sure, old-growth forestry con-
servation would yield a two-for-one payoff in habitat conservation.  But 
alas, conserving existing forests is not “additional” enough.26  And besides, 
the gas-slurping Americans might get away with something undeserved if 
 
23  See Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful Second Commitment Period for the 
Kyoto Protocol, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, May 2007, at 4, available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1230&context=ev (link) (noting that unlike uniform tax, cap-and-trade could 
permit control over global distributional effects of greenhouse gas reduction). 
24  See Flatt, supra note 1, at 142–45 (discussing issue of offsets in cap-and-trade context and noting 
issues as well as differing treatment in current legislative proposals). 
25  See Masahiro Amano & Roger A. Sedjo, FOREST SEQUESTRATION: PERFORMANCE IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES IN THE KYOTO PERIOD AND THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF SEQUESTRATION IN POST-KYOTO 
AGREEMENTS 31 (2006), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-Rpt-
ForestSequestrationKyoto.pdf (link) (describing conflicts between Europe and United States over for-
estry credits, very narrow credits actually allowed for trades under Kyoto Clean Development Mecha-
nism). 
26  See id. at 32 (noting requirement of “additionality” beyond current measures); Dennis D. Hirsch, 
Trading in Ecosystem Services: Carbon Sinks and the Clean Development Mechanism, 22 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 623, 630 (2007) (describing Kyoto requirement of additionality). 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/4/ 193 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY 
they can just pay for trees instead of cleaning up their act.27 
Fortunately, resistance toward forestry credits appears to have softened 
in the recent Bali discussions of post-Kyoto measures.28  But there has al-
ways been more to forestry offset concerns than mere jealous pouting.  Off-
sets of any kind can generate big savings, but they also call forth “The 
Revenge of the Naggers.”  As Professor Flatt observes, offsets in general 
raise a multitude of questions: Just what can be substituted for what?  Are 
all these offsets really fungible?  And can you monitor them?29  Sure, CO2 
here can trade for CO2 there—it is all the same.  But what about CO2 for 
methane?  Methane is harder to measure, so how does that factor into the 
equation?30  Rough equivalents may be all that can hoped for, but how 
rough is too rough?  Forests may be the most problematic of all, because 
each forest can be very different from others, and the contribution of each to 
climate control is very hard to assess.  Tropical rainforests might be fine, 
but as Professor Flatt points out, boreal forests may do more harm than 
good in global warming.31  To be sure, they absorb CO2, but they are just 
too green, absorbing too much heat in places that would otherwise be 
snowy white and reflect the suns rays back into the atmosphere.  Brandon 
Scarborough, writing for the Property and Environment Research Center, an 
outfit that generally reveres markets and property rights, thinks that forestry 
entitlements are not going to work as offsets, because they are too variable 
and too complicated.32  I think this is wrongheaded; some allowances (at 
least for tropical rainforests) will do a lot of good, both to reduce deforesta-
tion and to get LDCs on board with any plan.  But in the realm of offsets, 
the naggers’ questions are still important ones, both about measurement and 
about fungibility. 
In the final analysis, as Professor Flatt emphasizes, MBR methods are 
not a be-all and end-all for climate change control.33 We have a long history 
of command-and-control regulation, and we have had many important suc-
cesses with it.34  Aside from that, as Professor Flatt points out, a lot of 
 
27  See Philip M. Fearnside, Saving Tropical Forests as a Global Warming Countermeasure: An Is-
sue that Divides the Environmental Movement, 39 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 167, 171, 177 (2001) (ascribing 
European opposition to forestry offsets to a European wish to force the United States to pay more for 
energy usage and/or reduce its energy-consuming lifestyle). 
28  See Tom Wright, New Tool May Help in Fight to Curb CO2: Radar Enables Better Monitoring of 
Commitments to Preserve Forests, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2008, at B3 (describing new verification tech-
nology as well as increased concern to allow forestry conservation credits in Bali meetings). 
29  See Flatt, supra note 1, at 143. 
30  See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 9, at 629 (noting that greenhouse gases differ in important 
ways). 
31  See Flatt, supra note 1, at 143. 
32  See Brandon Scarborough, TRADING FOREST CARBON: A PANACEA OR PIPE DREAM TO ADDRESS 
CLIMATE CHANGE?, 7–10, 20 (July 2007). 
33  See Flatt, supra note 1, at 136. 
34  See generally Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 83 (praising command and control regulation based on specific technology). 
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Americans seem to prefer command-and-control regulation to MBRs.35  
Professor Flatt suggests vehicle energy standards as a candidate for contin-
ued regulation of a more traditional dirigiste type.36  I am unsure about that 
particular application, but it is clear that MBRs are not for everything.  Re-
sources for the Future researcher Dallas Burtraw, who has advocated MBR 
ideas for a long time, draws the line along the axis of monitoring.37  MBR 
approaches will only work on the kinds of resources and resource uses that 
we can monitor.  That is true of cap-and-trade, and it is true of taxes too.  
Unless we know what is going in and coming out, we simply cannot use 
property rights or taxing regimes effectively; they will unravel in a great 
heap once the first cheaters give license to the others to relax their own 
compliance.  But with monitoring (and of course enforcement), MBRs have 
a chance, and the cheaper and the more effective the monitoring, the better 
that chance is.  Failing the possibility of adequate monitoring, however, the 
only option is to fall back on more traditional regulation, insisting on par-
ticular technology. 
The bottom line is that MBR approaches are, after all, market-based 
regulation, and they require competent governmental supervision, even if 
nothing more than monitoring and enforcement.  MBR approaches in the 
environment are a fancy form of a property right, and like many other kinds 
of property, they offer opportunities for efficient resource management and 
mutually beneficial trades.  But in the end, even fancy property needs good 
cops. 
 
35  See Flatt, supra note 1, at 137. 
36  See id. 
37  See Climate Change: Lessons Learned from Existing Cap and Trade Programs: Written Testi-
mony Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
110th Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of Dallas Burtraw, Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future), available 
at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-CTst_07-Burtraw.pdf (link) (arguing that only sectors with clear 
baselines and monitoring ability are subjects for tradable rights). 
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